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SACEUR Exercise ABLE ARCHER 83 (U)

After Action Report (U)

I. (U) General.

A. [REDACTED] ABLE ARCHER (AA) is an annual SACEUR-sponsored Allied Command Europe CPX to practice command and control procedures with particular emphasis on the transition from purely conventional operations to chemical, nuclear and conventional operations. It is the culmination of SACEUR's annual AUTUMN FORGE exercise series.

B. [REDACTED] ABLE ARCHER 83 was conducted 7-11 Nov 83 with three days of "low spectrum" conventional play followed by two days of "high spectrum" nuclear warfare. Due to the low spectrum lead-in for AA 83, SAC was invited to provide liaison officers/advisors to observe and comment on operation of B-52 and KC-135 assets in accordance with SACEUR OPLANS 10604, FANCY GIRL and 10605, GOLDEN EAGLE.

C. (U) SAC Participation (Background)

1. [REDACTED] SAC participated in a previous AA with two observers. Due to the nature of the exercise and the possible political implications or inferences of B-52 involvement, future SAC participation was discouraged.

2. [REDACTED] SHAPE announced that AA 83 scenario had been changed to include three days of low spectrum activity and requested that SAC take an active part in the exercise. SAC proposed sending a team of two observers to each MSC, SHAPE and UK RAOC. SHAPE accepted this proposal, with the understanding that personnel were to act as observers/advisors to the staff at each level. A description of ADVON activities at these locations is contained in Section II.

D. (U) SAC objectives for ABLE ARCHER 83 were to:

1. [REDACTED] Observe NATO play of B-52 and KC-135 employment in accordance with SACEUR OPLANS.

2. (U) Determine if future participation is warranted, and if so, to what extent.

3. (U) Interface with SACEUR and MSC War Headquarters' staffs for mutual education.

4. (U) Update location guides.

E. (U) SAC ADVON composition for ABLE ARCHER 83 was as follows:

1. (U) AFNORTH:

Maj Paul J. Erbacher, 7AD/D00, Bomber Planner
Maj Arunas Siulte, 7AD/D08, Tanker Planner

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2. (U) AFCENT:

Lt Col Arthur J. Lindemer, HQ SAC/DOO, Bomber Planner
Maj Ronald J. Valentine, HQ SAC/XOO, Tanker Planner

3. (U) AFSOUTH:

Lt Col Michael J. DePaul, 8AF/DOX, Bomber Planner
Lt Col John P. Bateman, 8AF/DOX, Tanker Planner

4. (U) SHAPE:

Lt Col William N. Maxwell, 7AD/DOX, Bomber Planner
Maj Peter W. Hardin, 8AF/DOO, Tanker Planner

5. (U) UK RAOC:

Maj Geoffrey C. Wenke, 15AF/DOXX, Tanker Planner

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II. (U) ADVON OBSERVATIONS

A. (U) SHAPE

1. (S) GENERAL. ABLE ARCHER is too short for ADVON training or participation. The level of play PSC to MSC only dilutes the B-52 targeting process and the allocation of support packages. The level of SAC procedures training is almost nonexistent. Since ABLE ARCHER is primarily a nuclear procedures exercise, the viability of SAC play also comes into question. The AA Ops Order excepted SAC as players and stated they would act as observers (TAB C to APP III to Annex C). SAC observers at SHAPE were forced into playing SAC ADVON roles because there was no coordinated starting position for SAC assets. Each PSC was directed by SHAPE Op Order to develop unique Air Directives prior to SAC observer arrival. SHAPE started with full SAC force of bombers and tankers. Since the PSCs had developed their Air Directives for the first exercise day and published day two Air Directive at exercise initiation there were no requirements for B-52 allocation requests for days one and two. The underlying reason for the delay was a SACEUR B-52 allocation message for real-world tasking that had exercise information as the last paragraph. The last para (in summary) stated "Allocation from SACEUR was good for 48 hours." Thus, there were no requests from the PSCs for 7 and 8 Nov. However, CS SHAPE (Gen Dalton) wanted B-52 play. So the observers became ADVON players by default.

2. (S) ADVON OBSERVATIONS. Because of the level of play and the individual PSC scenarios only the bomber monitor had activity. The tanker planner at SHAPE had almost no activity due to use of SACEUR OPLAN, GOLDEN EAGLE, preallocations and no SACEUR direction to reallocate. The bomber observer acted as an advisor to the Air Operations Officer. Slides reflecting bomber beddown were initiated and updated with aircraft available daily. Since the USAFE OSC was not playing and units were not playing, a "Best Estimate" on bomber availability was made daily by the bomber observer. Attrition was neither planned for nor expected to be played, however, Southern Region reported one loss. During nuclear strikes SACEUR would only deconflict B-52s and strike assets plus or minus two hours of the TOT. The bomber planner also had to review B-52 targets for deconfliction with strike targets. SHAPE is the only place this can be done totally. PSCs can deconflict targets in their regions but a bomber strike near the border between two regions cannot be deconflicted at the PSC level. SACEUR bomber allocation messages were drafted and finalized for the Air Ops Officer. One mining request was received from AFNORTH but time lines would have made the mission occur after ENDEX. The request was denied because the TOT requested was far ahead of mine availability. An AFCENT request to disperse KC-135s to other UK bases was not acted upon due to SHAPE scenario inputs for chemical attacks and airfield attacks on the requested bases.

3. (S) FUTURE PARTICIPATION. SAC ADVON participation is not recommended for future AA exercises because the duration of play is too short for training; the exercise is primarily designed to exercise nuclear release procedures; the level of play does not allow the full target request allocation process to be exercised; the OSC does not play for logistics support; response cell and unit reports are not available and each region designs its own scenario.

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4. ~~See~~ OTHER COMMENTS. An interesting sidelight was a request by SACEUR's Action Cell to provide a real-world type answer to a scenario situation. The problem was to relieve pressure on northern Norway. B-52 capabilities and F-111 capabilities were briefed to the team for their knowledge and consideration. The area to be targeted would have been the Kola Peninsula. Based on the scenario, the massed troops and mobile defenses coupled with static defenses made high altitude attacks highly questionable and low altitude better. However, the F-111 with 24 bombs and hard TFR would be the optimum air delivery vehicle. (My opinion).

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B. (U) AFCENT.

1. ~~(b)~~ GENERAL. NATO was heavily engaged in conventional warfare at STARTEX. In the Central Region (CR), ORANGE (OR) forces were attacking along the entire German border with air attacks against BLUE (BL) airfields in Germany. OR attacks on UK airfields disrupted B-52 and KC-135 operations as well as destroying some aircraft. OR conducted chemical attacks throughout the exercise. (b)(5)

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2. (U) ADVON ACTIVITY. ADVON observer activities during AA 83 included:

(a) (U) Inputting correct data into the CCIS data base.

(b) (U) Observe the exercise and provide assistance. ERWIN desired 24-hour bomber and tanker coverage but it was impossible with two players. The 0600 to 1800L time frame was covered. We performed ADVON functions of drafting bomber request/allocation messages, tanker FCE allocation requests and coordinated on Air Directive inputs.

(c) ~~(b)~~ On E+1, we were directed to go to the Alternate War HQ (CREST-HIGH) which was located, for this exercise, at Heinrich Hertz Kaserne in Birkenfeld. The alternate staff desired SAC force expertise while they were in charge of OR operations which lasted all day E+1.

(d) (U) Helmets, gas masks and chemical suits were required. Gas masks were used by players at CREST HIGH for several hours after an OR chemical attack.

(e) (U) ERWIN was sealed for several hours during the evening of E+2.

3. (U) OPERATIONS.

(a) ~~(b)~~ Bomber Operations. SHAPE MSG 040900Z Nov established the initial CR bomber allocation at nine sorties per day along with tactical control for use against mobile targets. Nine sorties were also allocated for 8-10 Nov. The 11-12 Nov allocation was 18 sorties. B-52s were allocated to 2ATAF and 4ATAF to apply almost exclusively against mobile troop concentrations by using the target change tactic. There was incomplete information at AAFCE to determine the exact targets or the results of the attacks.

(1) (U) The B-52s were not included in the initial AAFCE data base and were added 7 Nov.

(2) ~~(b)~~ AAFCE did not receive any bomber request messages from 2 and 4ATAF even though they were requested several times. The ATAFs were addressed on the SHAPE message providing the initial allocation and new

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procedures. As a result, the AAFCE players examined the battle situation and made the bomber request to SACEUR as well as the subsequent suballocation to 2/4ATAF. The ADVON observer assisted with the process. Bombers were included in the Air Directive.

(3) ~~(c)~~ It is extremely difficult for the ATAFs to identify a mobile target in the detail requested by SHAPE for them to base the B-52 allocation. This may be the reason the ATAFs did not submit request messages.

(4) ~~(c)~~ A major BL counterattack was planned and conducted by 2ATAF. They requested 30 B-52s to provide support of their objectives. SACEUR denied the request because of heavy commitment of B-52s to the Northern Region. Nine sorties previously allocated were employed in the counterattack.

(b) ~~(c)~~ Tanker Operations. In the STARTEX AAFCE Air Directive the KC-135 force was suballocated to 2ATAF and 4ATAF by base. The status of the allocated force, with pre-exercise scenario attrition, was as follows:

BEDFORD	13	2ATAF
GREENHAM COMMON	26	2ATAF
BRIZE NORTON	12	4ATAF
FAIRFORD	<u>17</u>	4ATAF
TOTAL	68	AAFCE

Tankers were employed at an average sortie rate of 1.0 due to sortie generation degrade at all tanker bases IAW exercise scenario, high daily first-wave sortie requirements, and DISTAFF OPSTAT inputs. On E+2 AAFCE planners realized that the remaining allocated tankers would not meet their planned air refueling requirements on E+3 and 4. The refueling requirements increased due to increased effort given to air defense and OCA. AAFCE requested from SACEUR allocation of FCE assets from Mildenhall to provide 20 additional sorties for the next two days. SACEUR allocated 15 aircraft from Mildenhall to satisfy this urgent requirement. On E+3 AAFCE sent request to SACEUR/USCINCEUR/USAFE/3AF for authorization to use civilian UK airports Gatwick and Stanstead for gas and go operations. This request was prompted to increase survivability and sortie offload capability. By ENDEX this proposal was not approved.

4. (U) FUTURE PARTICIPATION. Future CR SAC ADVON participation in ABLE ARCHER is recommended only with the following stipulations:

(a) (U) Scenario must include at least three days of conventional activity.

(b) (U) Two bomber and two tanker planners participate at ERWIN/2ATAF/4ATAF (six personnel) for 24-hour coverage.

(c) (U) No B-52 fragging of sorties.

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(d) (U) Two DISTAFF representatives (24-hour coverage) are provided to input unit reports.

(e) (U) SAC ADVON bags are complete and available at 7 AD so minimum preparation is required.

(f) (U) ADVON players must be experienced.

(g) (U) ADVON support is strongly desired by COMAAFCE/SACEUR.

5. (U) OTHER COMMENTS. This exercise again reinforced the need to improve the SAC ADVON capability to conduct wartime operations. Emphasis must be placed on completing the following:

-- CINCSAC OPLAN 4102

-- SAC ADVON bags built/maintained and in readiness for real-world crisis situations.

-- SSCR 55-7 Vol VII/VIII (staff conventional directive)

-- Integration of B-52/KC-135 reporting procedures into the NATO system.

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C. (U) AFNORTH

1. (U) GENERAL.

(a) (U) The AFNORTH staff received the SAC ADVON with great enthusiasm but were somewhat disappointed when we were unable to provide 24-hour coverage. It was finally agreed that we would cover the day shift, since it would provide the majority of our activity.

(b) (U) The tanker representative took up a position in the RAOC (Regional Air Operations Center). The bomber representative was asked to divide his presence between the Targets Division and the RAOC, since his expertise and coordination would be required in both areas.

(c) (S) The target staff at AFNORTH appeared to be perfectly willing to manage the bomber allocation, select targets, and make request to SHAPE, in accordance with SHAPE message. They were relieved to have the SAC ADVON, since they were unsure of the mechanics to make such a request. Had the SAC Reporting Guide been available to them, they could have accomplished necessary messages.

2. (U) ADVON ACTIVITIES.

(a) (S) The bomber representative was involved in the Target Action Group Meeting, as an observer, since this dealt primarily with the deconfliction of NATO nuclear strikes and B-52/other aircraft conventional attacks. Both representatives attended Shift Changeover/Update Briefing, and Air Resources meeting. Level of questions for ADVON could have easily been answered by AFNORTH target staff.

(b) (S) With PSCs at COMMON, COMSONOR, and COMBALTAPO at minimal manning levels, requests from AFNORTH staff for B-52 target nominations went unanswered. COMBALTAPO did make one request for attacks and implementation of "EBB HORN" mining in COMLAND ZEELAND area.

(c) (U) Overall activity for the ADVON in the exercise was extremely limited.

3. (U) OPERATIONS.

(a) (U) BOMBER

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and execution time, and lack of escort on a heavily defended target, support could not be provided.

(b) (U) TANKER

(1) (S) AFNORTH was allocated 20 tankers to support operations in the Northern European Command (NEC). These were all used at a sortie rate of 1.5 each day. On 8 Nov AFNORTH requested that five KC-135s be positioned at Sola Airfield in Norway. These were used to provide more responsive refueling to marine and air defense aircraft in region. They also became an integral part of massed raid to extend range of F-111, F-4 and F-16 aircraft involved.

4. (U) FUTURE PARTICIPATION.

(a) (S) With PSCs at COMMON, COMSONOR, and COMBALTAP operating at minimum manning levels, requests from AFNORTH for target nominations for all aircraft went, for the most part, unanswered. What did filter up was oriented to the nuclear/chemical aspect of the exercise. The low play level at these locations did not allow for the feedback that should be available. Without increased NATO and US manning at all levels, we cannot justify expanded SAC ADVON participation.

(b) (S) As cited in paragraph 1c, the AFNORTH staff was willing to try operating without the SAC ADVON. Since in an actual conflict, the SAC ADVON may be delayed in arrival at locations, ABLE ARCHER would give NATO staffs an opportunity to at least become familiar with operations without SAC ADVON assistance. A small ADVON DISTAFF Cell at SHAPE could monitor inputs and act on them accordingly.

(c) (S) The presence of the SAC ADVON, especially in large numbers for an exercise of this nature, raises a sensitive, political issue concerning the role of the B-52. One may see an implication or make the inference that if B-52 aircraft are present in a nuclear scenario exercise, are they being used to perform strike missions? Numerous times during the exercise, the word "strike" was used in reference to B-52 sorties. While this is an obvious slip of the tongue and was quickly corrected, in most cases, it does serve to fuel any inference should a remark be made in a nonsecure environment. A large, if not fully manned, ADVON team which would be required to properly support ABLE ARCHER, being deployed to the many locations would only again give rise to speculation about the B-52 role.

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D. (U) AFSOUTH

1. (U) GENERAL.

(a) (U) MG Brown (AIRSOUTH C/S) (USAF) was briefed on the capabilities and tactics for the B-52 and KC-135. The briefing was based on the WINTEX 83 briefing in the "RED BOOK" updated for B-52G only operations. The briefing was then given to LG Brown (COMAIRSOUTH) (USAF) who later offered the briefing to Admiral Small (AFSOUTH) (USN) and his C/S LG Blont (USA).

(b) (S) Due to the numerous new personnel in AIRSOUTH, the published timelines were modified to gain maximum training to all personnel involved in B-52 operations. MG Brown was particularly helpful in guiding the AIRSOUTH planners to select targets that not only provided optimum utilization of the B-52, but also had significant impact on the overall war plan.

(c) (S) We worked with AIRSOUTH personnel to encourage composite attack profiles for maximum disruption of enemy air and mutual support for Allied aircraft. A coordinated attack against Verna and Burgas Harbors (B-52s), airfields in the harbor areas (fighters) and F-111 airfield attacks on the Crimean Peninsula were planned providing maximum mutual defense. Support packages utilizing F-4Gs, EA-6Bs and fighter cap were included in the attack. NOTE: The harbor attacks were planned three days earlier. Unconventional warfare personnel were inserted into the area two days prior to pass the updated DMPI to the planners for maximum effectiveness of the sortie. Beacon bombing was also discussed, but not used.

(d) (S) The level of play required us to be more than advisors and observers. To provide the coordination required we split into two shifts shortly after arrival. We had to press people to get the required data. This was an artificially created since the ATAFs did not have SAC ADVON representation. AFSOUTH is extremely interested in B-52 operations and the added capability it presents. Personnel participating in Dense Crop need to aggressively justify B-52 allocation requests to insure AFSOUTH has proper representation during the allocation cycle.

(e) (S) AFSOUTH needs data to update DIRE JUMBO. Recommend aircraft location and timelines be sent from HQ SAC to Maj Richard M. Meeboer, AIRSOUTH Plans and Policy (AIRSOUTH/PPPL). Also need a remark about E-3A refueling support, i.e., SHAPE will allocate E-3s and direct PSC/MSC to support.

(f) (S) Recommend "Red Book" be sent to US plans shops, PSCs and MSCs. The "Red Book" needs to be releasable to NATO (Print on cover). Also NATO Reporting Guide needs to be sent to PSCs and MSCs.

(g) (S) There is no set procedure for the AIRSOUTH/AFSOUTH staffs (OPS, IN, TGTS, ADVON) to get together to review the ATAF bomber requests, to have a coordinated, prioritized listing to send to SHAPE NLT 1100Z. There is little collective memory in the AIRSOUTH staff, even from the last WINTEX, hence it's been an education process to attempt to try to get the staffs together. The appearance is that the ATAFs sent their priority

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lists to AFSOUTH, who passes it to AIRSOUTH and it comes down to the AIRSOUTH Intel, Ops and SAC ADVON to select the targets. The targets are then selected by the Ops Chief who was at the AFSOUTH briefing (in most cases the targeting philosophy is different). As a result target nomination lists are late or not sent and the only request sent is the BOMREQ, which does not provide SACEUR with the required data to make proper allocations.

(h) [REDACTED] A complete review of COMAIRSOUTH OPLAN 45604, "DIRE JUMBO" was completed. The COMM, Restricted areas, ECM, safe passage, emergency fields, procedures, etc. should be reviewed for possible inclusion in SAC 4102 or a SACR. This also applies to review of all MSC/PSC/SACEUR plans impacting SAC 4102. 45604 also requires backup targets from the ATAFs. It was explained that this should be removed from their plan.

(i) [REDACTED] We received only one written answer to the BOMREQ during the exercise. This mission was coordinated requiring all aircraft in the same time block. As it turned out half of the aircraft were in a different time block, and during daylight hours (SHAPE MSG 081315Z Nov for 10 Nov allocation). For staff training, to keep from destroying the combined, coordinated attack on Vara and Burgan we flew as planned.

(j) [REDACTED] No message allocation for 11 Nov was received. Telecon received on morning of 10th from Col Brown (SHAPE) cut the precoordinated number with LTC Hass from 15 to 9.

(k) [REDACTED] E-3A refueling were coordinated at the AFSOUTH level. I feel the refueling should be handled at the ATAF level to afford the tanker scheduler the opportunity to manage his scarce refueling assets. Each E-3 is using one and one half tankers (three sorties) each per day. We consistently had one in FIVE ATAF and one in SIX ATAF. At one point we had one in each ATAF, which would be a heavy load on the AFSOUTH tankers.

2. (U) ADVON ACTIVITY.

- (a) (U) Attend TGT selection meeting (held one in AIRSOUTH last day).
- (b) (U) Prepare slides for AIRSOUTH update briefing 1900L/0900L.
 - (1) (U) BDA (yesterday's missions).
 - (2) (U) Bomber activity (Today--actually next morning).
 - (3) (U) Bomber activity (Tomorrow--actually two days away).
 - (4) (U) Tanker activity.
- (c) (U) Prepare TGTs message.
- (d) (U) Prepare BOMREQ.
- (e) (U) Prepare SUBALL.

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- (f) (U) Prepare TFG tasking to ATAFs (artificial due to exercise).
- (g) (U) Tanker messages to support E-3 (artificial due to exercise).
- (h) (U) Input to COMAIRSOUTH ASSESSREP due by 1700L.

3. (U) OPERATIONS.

(a) ~~(b)~~ Bomber. A total of 71 sorties were requested, 59 scheduled (based on final allocation) 50 of the 59 were flown by ENDEX. A total of four aircraft were lost due to ground and shipborne SAMS. Targets attacked included massed troops, soft armor, choke points and supply routes. One three-ship sortie was against a helicopter landing area prior to ADVON arrival (a total of on three helos were destroyed on that mission).

(b) ~~(b)~~ Tanker. The only tanker involvement was with E-3A refueling. We received sporadic tanker inputs from ATAFs due to no SAC participation at that level.

4. ~~(b)~~ FUTURE PARTICIPATION. With only a few locations with a SAC ADVON, too many simulations are required. It is confusing to the MSCs because they expect it to work like WINTEX. Recommend SHAPE allocate the B-52s and KC-135s to the MSCs at start of exercise and the MSCs work the exercise without the SAC ADVON.

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E. (U) UK RAOC

1. (b) GENERAL. I was in place at exercise location at STARTEX. I visited 3 AF Liaison Cell, DISTAFF, and RAF tanker personnel to determine level of exercise play. Although the Master Scenario Events List indicated a significant requirement for KC-135 air refueling support of UK Air Defense operations and multiple vertical dispersals, UK AIR staff personnel viewed ABLE ARCHER as a "nuclear procedures" exercise and chose not to play actively from the ADOC and SOCS during the conventional phase (7-9 Nov). The first KC-135 air refueling missions took place at 0600Z on 9 Nov. Since the ADOC and SOCS are the prime employers of air refueling and direct vertical dispersals their lack of participation left little requirement for SAC participation in this exercise.

(U) I spent the majority of my time learning how to use the Air Staff Management Aid (ASMA) computer system, becoming familiar with the RAOC layout and what each cell does, and discussing present and future concepts with RAF and 3 AF liaison personnel.

2. (U) ADVON ACTIVITY. The following represents Tanker ADVON duties based on my WINTER 83 participation at UK RAOC:

(a) (U) Coordinate KC-135 allocation to the SOCS with the ADOC.

(b) (b) Prepare ATOS for TPW. (NOTE: This is only done for planned missions such as E-3A support or fighter deployments. OPCON of UK tanker assets supporting Air Defense rests with the SOCS and they launch the tankers unless sufficient warning is available, then the tanker cell will direct the launch by telecon. In lieu of an ATO for Air Defense we pass an alert response condition (60 min, 30 min, or 15 min) for the required number of KC-135s for a time block and the controlling SOCs.

(c) (b) Coordinate dispersal bases for all U.K. based airborne KC-135s and vertically dispersed KC-135s with 3 AF Liaison Cell, Ground Defense Cell, Contingency Plans Cell, and the Operations Support Cell when under air attack.

(d) (b) Coordinate air refueling requirements with the Tactical Air Support for Maritime Operations (TASMO) Cell.

(e) (b) Provide backup to 3 AF Liaison Cell in notifying TPW response cells of airborne dispersal when directed by ADOC.

(f) (U) Provide 3 AF Liaison Cell with a daily operations summary for CINCUKAIR's daily briefing.

As noted in para 1f only a limited amount of item 1 was played during ABLE ARCHER 83 due to reduced play by UKRAOC cells.

3. (U) OPERATIONS.

(b) KC-135 Activity

DAY	NO. OF SORTIES	TOTAL FLY TIME	NO. RCVRs	TOTAL OFFLOAD
7 Nov	0	0	0	0

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DAY	NO. OF SORTIES	TOTAL FLY TIME	NO. RCVRs	TOTAL OFFLOAD
8 Nov	0	0	0	0
9 Nov	8	24.0	32 F-4	192.0M
10 Nov	11*	39.0	12 F-4	72.0M
11 Nov	0	0	0	0
<hr/> TOTAL	19	63.0	44	264.0M

*Eight KC-135s launched for survival.

4. (S) FUTURE PARTICIPATION. The CINCUKAIR Staff's decisions not to man all RAOC cells or actively respond to exercise events during ABLE ARCHER 83 made it non cost effective for SAC ADVON participation. CINCUKAIR personnel view this exercise as strictly a nuclear procedures CPX. A SACEUR decision (sometime between EXORD development and STARTEX) to reduce the level of nuclear exchange between Blue and Orange cancelled most of the British interest in ABLE ARCHER. The British also view that if Blue is resorting to the use of nuclear weapons to stop the Orange advance, then most of their Air Defense assets have been lost (fighter and tanker) and there is no requirement for air refueling. Also, the lack of unit response cell play (BOTH US TPWs, and RAF SOCS and tanker bases) makes SAC ADVON play unrealistic. The tanker advisor is reduced to simulating all coordination required between TPWs, SOCs and the UKRAOC cells on ATOs, airborne dispersal, and daily Ops summaries. This is not a good exercise for SAC ADVON training if procedural play by participants does not change for future exercises.

(U) SAC ADVON participation at UKRAOC for future ABLE ARCHERS should be eliminated unless the following conditions can be met:

(a) (S) Full manning and active participation by UKRAOC cells in ADOC, Ground Defense, Tanker, USAFE, and contingency plans.

(b) (U) Active response cell play from the SOCs and a TPW for UKAIR allocated KC-135s.

(c) (U) 7 AD, 306 SW or 11 SG provide the tanker advisor to reduce the cost of sending CONUS-based ADVON personnel and provide flexibility if UKAIR reduces its enthusiasm during future exercises.

5. (U) OTHER

(a) (U) Tanker beddown in UK.

(1) (S) Discussion: I was briefed we would use the CRESTED EAGLE 84 tanker beddown for ABLE ARCHER. The MSEL called for a beddown based on the ENDEX position for WINTEX 83 which was based on FY 82 UK beddown. This caused concern among several strike command personnel over (1) the use of Scampton by both RAF Victors and US KC-135s (they claim Scampton can't

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support both); (2) The ability of Cottesmore to support KC-135s presently (they are delighted that UKAIR-allocated KC-135s are not collocated with other MSCs' assets) and (3) that the 84 position was not officially sanctioned or approved. I had a long discussion with SQ LDR John Ward, CINCUAIR/Contingency Plans about future initiatives for US COBs in UK. Basically they are as follows: (1) Replace Scampton with Elvington, (2) move US A-7s from Finningly to Manston opening up Finningly for KC-135s, (3) reduce the base loading at Fairford, Greenham Common, and Mildenhall by using other UK airfields not specifically identified for KC-135. NOTE: SQ LDR Ward's views, however, may only be Strike Command's position and not that of MODUKAIR or USAFE.

(2) ~~(b)~~ Recommendations: (1) More preexercise coordination between SAC and 7 AD and UKAIR ADVON players on tanker beddown to be used. It would also be helpful if RAOC ADVON players were given as much background information as possible on the actual tanker beddown status of negotiations to preclude future embarrassment. (2) None. SQ LDR Ward's comments are provided for your information.

(b) (U) Status of CINCUAIR Air Refueling Plan.

(1) ~~(a)~~ Discussion: The CINCUAIR Air Refueling Plan is still in the conceptual stage. SQD LDR Graham Lanchbury has been the only tanker planner assigned to Strike Command/Plans since March 1983. His daily involvement with the Ascension Island to Falkland Islands refueling missions has precluded any work on the MSC plan. FLT LT Paul McKernan has recently been assigned to Strike/Plans on a temporary basis until a permanent second position is filled (in about three months). He has been given the MSC refueling plan as his top priority. I spent an entire day with him over GOLDEN EAGLE, COTTON CURE and AFNORTH's BENT BOOM (Draft), providing recommendation on plan format and content, and providing points of contact at 11 SG and 7 AD to get assistance in plan development. I recommended he use BENT BOOM as a model since operations to be conducted in AFNORTH are the most similar to UKAIR. The unique procedures used by UKAIR in Command control, airborne dispersal/survival scramble, enroute communications, and air refueling during hostilities required they be formulated into a written plan for use by our TPWs and all MSC tasking UK-based KC-135s as soon as possible.

(2) (U) Recommendation: That 7 AD actively monitor the progress of CINCUAIR's air refueling plan and provide any expertise in tanker operations/command control required by Strike Command to expedite plan completion.

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III. FUTURE PARTICIPATION

A. (S) The preceding section contained the critiques written by the ADVON representatives. Due to travel restrictions, only an informal meeting was held at 7 AD, which not all members were able to attend. The comments and observations are printed virtually verbatim--only editorial changes made--from the reports received. The critiques were prepared in isolation, yet the same themes occur in all. These themes are: short duration of exercise does not allow for real allocation cycle to be played; time lines are unrealistically reduced; short duration demands experienced personnel since there is no time for training; low level of play at most headquarters does not allow for realistic play or appraisal; and the sensitive issue of B-52 operations being conducted in conjunction with an exercise primarily designed to test nuclear release procedures.

B. (U) Based on above comments and our participation in ABLE ARCHER 83, 7AD recommends no further SAC ADVON participation in the ABLE ARCHER series of exercises.



GARY G. DURKEE, Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

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